DO OBJECTIONS TO MOVITVATIONAL JUDGMENT INTERNALISM CRIPPLE GIBBARD'S ACCOUNT?

Aaron Cobb

The debate between externalism and internalism has received extensive treatment in recent literature. Though this debate is technical, it arises out of concerns over moral truth, realism, objectivity, and authority. [1] Recently, Alan Gibbard’s norm-expressivistic account of normative judgment has been criticized for implicitly assuming a suspect form of internalism—namely motivational judgment internalism (MJI). [2] In this paper, I will briefly elucidate the concept of MJI. Second, I will locate and expound the extent to which Gibbard is truly an internalist. In so doing, I will challenge Nicholas Sturgeon’s contention that Gibbard is an externalist (Sturgeon 1995: 405). Third, I will explicate the recent criticisms of MJI within the literature, including attempts to meet these objections.  I will argue that Gibbard’s account does not answer the objections and is rendered dubious at best.

Motivation Judgment Internalism (MJI)

Before one can see how Gibbard assumes MJI, a brief characterization is needed.    Internalism covers a broad range of theses in the relevant literature. [3]   Generally speaking, “‘Internalism’ in ethics is a cluster of views according to which there is an ‘internal’ connection between moral obligations and either motivations or reasons to act morally; ‘externalism’ says that such connections are contingent (Copp 1995: 187).” 

MJI postulates an internal connection between moral judgments and the motivation to act in accordance with those judgments. MJI is distinct from internalist theses about reasons for action, though there are some overlapping concerns and criticisms. [4]   It must also be distinguished from what Sigrún Svavarsdóttir has called Application Internalism (AI).  AI contains the application conditions of a moral judgment to an individual. Svavarsdóttir contends, “…motivation internalism has to be distinguished from the thesis that in order for a moral judgment to be appropriately applied to the conduct of an individual, that individual has to be motivated under specific conditions to undertake (or avoid) the action positively (or negatively) appraised (Svavarsdóttir: 171).”  These distinctions allow for each internalist thesis to be evaluated independently. [5]   Thus, a criticism of one form does not necessarily indict all internalist theses.

What emerges from this taxonomy is a clarified conception of MJI.  First, MJI holds that it is a conceptual necessity that there is an internal connection between moral judgments and the motivation to act in accordance with the judgment.  This can be taken to mean that moral judgments intrinsically motivate—that is, moral judgments motivate without aid from any distinct conative states (Svavarsdóttir: 163). This is a strong version of MJI, however. Most of the literature defending MJI employs a weaker version (Svavarsdóttir: 163; Shafer-Landau 2000: 268). Weak MJI is compatible with a collaborative view that “…moral judgment has its roots in a distinct conative state that is, however, necessarily connected to the moral judgment (Svavarsdóttir: 163).”  It also allows for motivation to be overridden by competing concerns.  Many times, weak MJI has an attached exception clause like the following: moral judgments necessarily motivate, “except in individuals suffering from motivational disorders that affect them more generally (Svavarsdóttir: 165).” 

Weak MJI has received much support in the literature due to the fact that it contains several important internalist intuitions. First, it is usually held that one’s judgment of what is right in a situation will motivate her to act accordingly.  Copp asserts, “Moral judgments are intrinsically normative or choice-guiding, that they are, very roughly, relevant to action or choice because of their content (Copp 1995: 187).”  If there is a necessary connection between one’s judgments and her motivation, then it is clear that she will be motivationally affected by what her judgments require.  Likewise, internalists sometimes evince optimism about getting one to be motivated if they can see moral matters in the correct light. This seems to be a consequence of an internalist stance.  A third intuition incorporated by weak MJI is the following: it seems that externalism removes the ‘dignity’ of morality by requiring some form of external sanction for action.  All of these intuitions must be accommodated if a defense of externalism is plausible.

Gibbard’s Implicit Assumption [6]

            With a clarified understanding of weak MJI and the intuitions it seeks to capture, we can assess Gibbard’s project.  In his attempt to provide a norm-expressivistic account of normative judgment, he offers this cryptic starting point: “…to call something rational is to express one’s acceptance of norms that permit it (7).”  Part of this account is explaining specifically what it is to accept a norm, particularly as it relates to the psychology of the human experience and action (46). [7]

In Gibbard’s discussion of what it is to accept a norm, he implicitly assumes weak MJI as he points to the acceptance of norms as a central factor in human thinking and motivation.  His speculative inquiry must account for conflicting motivations, however.  The interesting aspect of his account is (1) how he accommodates these conflicts and (2) whether the distinctions he makes between being in the grip of norms, internalizing norms, and accepting norms will offer him a way of answering the recent criticisms of MJI.

Gibbard begins by noting that some conflicts in motivation involve a ‘weakness of the will.’ Typically, “Acceptance of a norm is motivating at least to a degree: believing I ought to stop tends to make me stop (56).” When one is overpowered by other motivations, he asserts that there are two motivational systems involved.  One system is an animal control system which humankind shares with other animals (56). The other system is a normative motivational system, which is unique to human beings and works through one’s acceptance of norms (56). Gibbard finds these conflicts of motivation as an inevitable part of the evolutionary story he offers. The normative control system evolved because it increased the possibility of complex planning and coordination through language (57).  Conflicting motivations, thus, are between an evolutionary adaptation of a higher level and prior adaptations.

There are other conflicts, however, which do not fit so nicely into these categories. These cases are conflicts between what Gibbard calls our “better judgment” and other powerful social motivations like embarrassment (58).  Many of these situations seem to be conflicts of acceptance of one kind of norms versus the acceptance of other kinds of norms. In the example of Milgram’s experiments, Gibbard comments, “The norm of non-infliction of harm prevails in the judgments of detached observers, whereas the norms of cooperativeness, taking directions, and doing one’s job control the agent in the heat of the social encounter (60).” This is not to say that they see the norms of cooperativeness, taking directions, and doing one’s job as overriding all other norms, but instead that they are in the grip of these norms. In fact, when you are in the grip of certain norms, you do not genuinely accept that these norms override other norms. Elsewhere, Gibbard suggests this would represent a specious symmetry (Gibbard 1985: 16). The norms play differing psychological roles while in the midst of the social encounter; the norm, which has you in its grip, controls your behavior.

Another important distinction in Gibbard’s account is the difference between accepting a norm and internalizing a norm. Internalizing underlies both the acceptance of norms and being in the grip of norms. Internalizing a norm is used to describe the following: “…situations in which I accept a norm as rightly controlling on balance but would be in its grip if I did not (Gibbard 1985: 17).” 

Generally speaking, to internalize a norm is “…to have a motivational tendency of a particular kind to act on that pattern…Tendencies to act on the pattern (or propensities to acquire these tendencies when growing up exposed to the pattern) constitute biological adaptations for coordination (70-71).”  A norm is, “…a prescription or imperative that gives the rule a sophisticated observer could formulate. The imperative is a formulation of a pattern which, in effect, control’s the organism’s behavior (70).”  The norms that are internalized with the greatest strength will prevail in the midst of a pressing situation, while the norms one accepts will prevail in thinking about an absent situation (71).

As one can see from the above, acceptance of a norm involves thinking through and about absent situations. This is achieved, on Gibbard’s account, primarily through language, which serves to coordinate. Gibbard sketches this story through three specific faculties—namely normative governance, normative discussion, and normative avowal.  Normative governance is the influence that the evaluation of appropriate actions, beliefs, and emotions in absent situations has on people when they experience the actual situation (72). Normative discussion is the actual working out of the appropriate responses to the absent situation within a community (72-73). Normative discussion will coordinate if two things hold: (1) If it brings about consensus and (2) If it moves people to act according to the established responses (73). The latter is normative governance. The former involves mechanisms of mutual influence and demands for consistency. Normative avowal, roughly, is taking a position in normative discussion. Gibbard then advances this rough definition of what it is to accept a norm: “To accept a norm, we might say, is in part to be disposed to avow it in unconstrained normative discussion, as a result of the workings of demands for consistency in the positions one takes in normative discussion (74).” We see here a further distinction between internalizing a norm and accepting a norm; internalization works without normative discussion.

This brief overview is essential to Gibbard’s understanding of motivation. His ideas of normative governance are of chief concern.  Gibbard notes, “There must be some tie of avowal to action or the entire coordination story I have been telling would have no basis (76).” Gibbard relies on an analogy of normative governance with political governance. In a government, the rules established must carry some influence or the government does not truly rule. This, however, does not preclude members of the ruled to break some of the regulations. Likewise, the norms one accepts will guide a person’s actions, but only with a “mitigated tendency (77).”

Gibbard seems to think that this will allow for the diversity in human behavior—from following one’s accepted norms to deviating from these norms.  In his view, there is a necessary connection between accepted norms and action, but conflicting motivations, internalized norms, or being in the grip of norms can mitigate this tendency. More succinctly put, when “normative discussion of a situation influences action and emotion in like situations…we can speak of norms as ‘governing’ action and emotion, and it is through this governance that normative discussion serves to coordinate (Gibbard 1985: 20).” So, the necessary connection between judgments and motivation to act in accordance with those judgments is when the thinking through of absent situations within a community influences people to act, believe, or feel in the ways in which it was decided would be appropriate to act, believe, or feel in like situations. 

This does not always occur. Sometimes there are conflicts between animal appetites and acceptance of norms. Other times, there are conflicts between norms. In these situations, however, there is no weighing of the norms. Rather, what happens in the heat of the social encounter is that what one actually does is a matter of the norms that have him in their grip—the strongest internalized norms. These situations, however, are not reflections of judgments that necessarily motivate the agent, for they have been mitigated by other conflicts. Regardless, whenever there is a genuine acceptance of norms, it will necessarily influence a person’s actions—that is, it will be a conceptual necessity that one is motivated to act in accordance with the norms she accepts. 

Sturgeon’s Characterization of Gibbard

My portrayal of Gibbard as an internalist can be resisted. In fact, Sturgeon suggests that Gibbard is actually an externalist (Sturgeon 1995: 405).  Since my project is based on the assumption that Gibbard’s account is flawed because of his internalist underpinnings, I must offer a response to Sturgeon. I will first sketch Sturgeon’s characterization of Gibbard’s supposed externalism and then offer a critique.

Sturgeon maintains that “[Gibbard] holds that when agents are moved to do what they think morally required, their motivation depends on some conative state in addition to their moral conviction (Sturgeon 1995: 405).”  That is, an agent’s judgment of moral right and wrong only expresses the acceptance of norms which permit feelings of guilt or anger. The judgment alone does not endorse any specific actions, or express norms which permit certain actions. According to Sturgeon, these taken together recommend that Gibbard is an externalist.  I have argued, though, that weak MJI allows the possibility of moral judgment being rooted in a distinct conative state which is necessarily connected with motivation, so Sturgeon’s critique must be more acute.

Sturgeon’s main criticism focuses on the fact that the sentiments Gibbard has pointed to—namely guilt and anger—do not guarantee a necessary connection with action. He offers two specific reasons for this claim. First, if the motivational connection between guilt and action is based on the fact that people do not like to have guilty feelings, then their actions are being deterred by an external sanction. In addition to this, it seems that there are some who are attracted to guilty feelings rather than being repelled.  Second, if guilt has motivation built into it, then on Gibbard’s account “these motivations are all tailored to the role of guilt as an after-the-fact, picking-up-the-pieces kind of reaction (Sturgeon 1995: 419).” This does not prescribe any avoidance of the action in the future. Even if it did prescribe avoidance of action in the future, the phenomenology of deeply felt guilt does not guarantee an actual change in action. 

Perhaps Sturgeon is correct in interpreting Gibbard as an externalist, but he admits that this places Gibbard in an unusual place as a non-cognitivist (Sturgeon 1995: 405). [8] While Sturgeon’s point is well taken, I think it is inappropriate to interpret Gibbard as an externalist given his non-cognitivistic underpinnings. Though there may be only a contingent connection between the conative states of guilt or anger and action, it seems that Gibbard must maintain that there is a necessary connection. This is true because Gibbard’s evolutionary story of the normative control system and the advantage it serves to coordinate is only true insofar as normative governance is actually possible (76, 105-150). Gibbard maintains that if there is not a mitigated tendency towards action then his story has no basis.

Sturgeon’s critique of the relative strength of the conative states of anger and guilt and the connection to action can be articulated as a criticism of Gibbard’s reliance upon internalism. The claim could be made in the following way: (1) Gibbard assumes that there is a conceptually necessary connection between holding a judgment and being motivated to act in accordance with that judgment; (2) This is only true if the conative states Gibbard points to are necessarily connected with motivation; (3) The conative states of guilt and anger are not necessarily connect with motivation; (4) Therefore, Gibbard’s account is flawed because it implicitly assumes MJI.

Recent Criticisms and Replies

            The criticism just noted is reminiscent of other objections pressed upon defenders of MJI. These objections fall into two specific categories. Typically, internalists are criticized through an appeal to an ‘amoralist’ of a kind. [9]   Second, internalists are expected to carry the burden of proof for the argument.  Some claim that prospects of meeting this burden are doubtful. [10] In the following section I will elucidate these objections and in turn attempt to show how internalists have responded. I will conclude that Gibbard must defend MJI on the basis of a plausible foundation of non-cognitivism. If there are reasons to doubt the plausibility of his story, then the prospects of defending MJI seems dubious.

This first kinds of critique levied against internalists are appeals to ‘amoralists’.  An ‘amoralist’ is defined loosely as being, “Disposed to disregard what he takes to be genuine moral demands (Shafer-Landau: 271).” An amoralist has the following characteristics: (1) what he judges to be right action must be perceived clearly and be present to his mind; (2) he must genuinely, or sincerely, judge that a specific action is right for the relevant circumstances; (3) he must not have any general motivational disorders; and (4) he must, nevertheless, remain unmotivated to act in accordance with his judgments.

Externalists will imagine actual or hypothetical people who meet these criteria and assert that the internalist position is thus defeated. Defenders of MJI, however, must show that it is incoherent to suppose that this kind of person exists. Externalists will only need to show “the conceptual possibility of a person who on a single occasion fails to be motivated by a moral judgment he endorses (Shafer-Landau: 271).” 

Broadly, the ‘amoralist’ will be in one of the following two categories: either there will be a contingent connection between his moral judgments and the perceived content of the moral demands, or there will be a contingent connection between his moral judgments and his psychological faculties (Shafer-Landau: 275). Whether or not the ‘amoralist’ is in fact possible will primarily turn on how the internalist understands ‘genuine,’ or ‘sincere,’ moral judgments.

            There are several ways the internalist can respond.  First, she can claim that the ‘amoralist’ is actually doing lip service to the actual judgment, though he wrongly assumes he is being sincere. Second, she can assert that the ‘amoralist’ is actually motivated though he does not know that he is motivated. Third, the internalist can hold that the externalist’s hypothetical ‘amoralist’ is incoherent. She will deny that one can actually imagine such a person, or deny that imaginability entails possibility. Finally, the internalist could contend that the statement containing the moral judgment actually lacks moral content. This is plausible if the non-cognitivism underlying it is plausible. In order to claim this, the internalist must explicate the non-cognitive states expressed in the moral judgment and she must ensure that these states are necessarily motivating. [11]  

An externalist can counter each of these internalist responses. His first step is to hold the first two internalist responses suspect. Both of these responses assume the ‘amoralist’ is ignorant of what motivates him, or what he takes to be right or dutiful.  While this may be true, the externalist maintains that we are not in the position to know this about the person (Shafer-Landau: 276). Externalists can argue that this internalist response is simply assuming, in their response, a conceptual stance that eliminates the possibility of such a person. This is, however, the disputed concept, so it does not serve the internalists’ purposes (Svavarsdóttir: 181).

            This same kind of critique can be used against the third internalist response. If the internalist is going to argue that the ‘amoralist’ is conceptually incoherent, she must not rely on the internalist intuition of what it is to hold a moral judgment. This would not serve the purposes of the argument and would be approaching circularity. 

We are left with the fourth internalist response. As noted above, this defense of MJI is only as plausible as the non-cognitivism that underwrites it. Shortly, we shall see how Gibbard could use this form of defense for MJI within his own account. I will leave the externalist response to this critique until we have explicated Gibbard’s own defense.

A second kind of critique of the internalist position is methodological. In this objection the question is raised: In the debate between externalism and internalism, who must carry the burden of proof? The debate, however, shows that externalists and internalists have conflicting intuitions about the nature of moral judgments and the corresponding motivation. Svavarsdóttir concludes, “When there are conflicting intuitions (among intelligent and sensible people) about which hypotheses are in the running as an explanation of some observable phenomena, the burden of the argument is on those who insist on a more restrictive class of explanations (Svavarsdóttir: 179).” By embedding our critiques of internalism in empirical examples of ‘amoralists’, externalists bring this methodological principle to bear.

Therefore, any theory which incorporates MJI must be argued to (emphasis mine; Shafer-Landau: 270). The phenomenology of moral experience does not necessarily support internalism. Rather, the appearances only tell us what is usually the case; it does not stipulate a necessary connection simply by observation. Shafer-Landau asserts, “We are misled if we argue from the obvious fact that moral judgments are usually motivating, to the stronger claim that they cannot fail to be (Shafer-Landau: 288).”

These recent criticisms serve two purposes. First, they aim to place the burden of proof squarely on the shoulders of the internalist. Second, they purpose to cast doubt, through counterexamples, that defenders of MJI can actually shoulder the burden. If successful the externalist is left in the following position: either the externalist intuition is correct and there is only a contingent connection between moral judgment and motivation, or the defenders of MJI must provide a defense of internalism by giving it the foundation of a plausible theory of non-cognitivism. This theory must include which non-cognitive states get expressed in the judgment and expound on how these states are necessarily motivating. Gibbard seems to take this route (Shafer-Landau 2000: 270; Svavarsdóttir: 173). He asserts that the non-cognitive states expressed in a moral judgment are commitments to norms regulating guilt and anger. He also explains that these are necessarily motivating in that there must be some tendency for accepted norms to motivate—normative governance—or else his evolutionary story of coordination disintegrates.

Summary

Throughout this paper, I have been attempting to show that MJI is a dubious position to hold, that Gibbard implicitly assumes this position, and as a result, that Gibbard’s project suffers a salient flaw. I have concluded that defenders of MJI carry the argumentative burden and must argue us to their position. I maintained that the best defense of MJI comes from a plausible non-cognitivistic story which underwrites it. 

Evaluating Gibbard’s non-cognitivistic, or expressivistic story, then, is the most appropriate way to analyze whether my critique proves devastating. This, however, is the subject of another project. At most, I can point to some temporary conclusions following the work of Nicholas Sturgeon. 

Sturgeon’s Critique of Gibbard’s Story

            Gibbard’s reliance upon an evolutionary story is central to his norm-expressivistic account. While others have attempted to explain morality naturalistically, Gibbard’s project is both novel and innovating. His story, however, is contestable on two levels.  First of all, his evolutionary understanding of conflicting motivations seems incomplete (Sturgeon 1995: 414). Secondly, his evolutionary story as a whole seems to deflate a central Darwinian concern (Sturgeon: 415-418). Let us turn to conflicting motivations.

Sturgeon notes that the distinctions between being in the grip of norms, internalizing norms, and accepting norms do not cover the full realm and diversity of motivational factors (Sturgeon 1995: 414). It is a stretch to think that all of our behaviors can fit into this tidy picture. It seems all too convenient that Gibbard can accommodate every behavior in three specific motivational systems.

Also, Sturgeon wonders what kind of evidence is available for the peculiarly social motivations which give rise to the internalization of norms (Sturgeon 1995: 416).  Though Gibbard compares this with shared animal features and adaptations, this seems highly speculative for several reasons: (1) it seems there would be no reproductive advantage to this distinct motivational system; (2) these social motivations can be and are taught through language, though Gibbard says that they exist outside of normative discourse; and (3) these social motivations are subject to change in critical discussion.  “What seems primarily to be dictating those details is just that they are needed for his non-cognitivistic theory of normative judgment (Sturgeon: 415).” 

In addition to these considerations, Gibbard’s account seems to deflate a key Darwinian point—that is, any feature once selected can end up doing things other than what it was selected for (Sturgeon 1995: 418). Selection stories, in general, talk about the history of certain features, organs, or faculties which developed as adaptations because of reproductive advantages. These stories do not speculate what would happen to these same features in radically different environments. Suffice it to say, the gap between environments could be too large, or too far removed, to tell us anything interesting about one environment compared with the other environment. “Even if [Gibbard’s] story about hunter-gatherers is entirely right, it tells us only what normative judgments did among hunter-gatherers; it is silent about what they do or don’t do in a very different setting such as ours (Sturgeon: 418).”

Conclusion

            From the above considerations, we see that the internalist/externalist debate is entrenched within a much larger context. We have seen that MJI holds a necessary connection between judgment and motivation. I have argued that, in light of Gibbard’s evolutionary underpinnings, his norm-expressivistic account implicitly relies on MJI. I have shown that MJI must be argued to and its best defense is a plausible foundation of non-cognitivism. In this final section I attempted to show some areas of weakness in Gibbard’s non-cognitivistic story. These weaknesses are meant to foster doubt about the plausibility of this particular naturalistic story. If what I have concluded above is correct, then Gibbard carries the burden of proof in this debate. As we have seen, however, his chances of success are dubious at best.

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