Philosophy Department - Proceedings of the Heraclitean Society

A FOOL’S ERRAND: POLITICAL THEORY FROM DARWINIAN EVOLUTION

Jacob Sheber

Employing evolution in philosophical pursuits is a tricky project with a poor track record. Even with the pitfalls clearly marked, many evolutionary thinkers tumble in anyway. Furthermore, the mere mention of Darwin is like a lightning rod, drawing criticisms from both the religious right, the political left, and even a few in between. Nevertheless, the insights into human nature ascertained through evolutionary psychology are too important to be dismissed or ignored. How a society ought to be structured, in my opinion, is the most important question in philosophy. The various answers to this question have impacted directly on the lives of human beings around the world, and will continue to do so in the future. Specifically, the blending of evolutionary theory and political philosophy, in the past, has led to immeasurable pain and suffering. So, it is with careful consideration that this paper has been composed.

Insights gained through the study of human evolutionary history inform and support a libertarian political ethic. Using evolutionary psychology in such a manner avoids the errors made by past thinkers who attempted to construct a political philosophy directly from evolution. Furthermore, evolutionary theory is not as politically flexible as some have alleged. To support these claims, this paper will review some past attempts at deriving political and moral truths from evolution. By doing so, the failures of the past can hopefully guide us in the right direction. This paper will also look at Randy Barnett’s The Structure of Liberty. Its natural law method of analysis will provide a framework from which we can properly view evolution and its implications for politics. Next, I will demonstrate that evolutionary theory does indeed support and inform Barnett’s libertarian ideas. Lastly, I will attempt to thwart the claim that evolution is neutral in its application to politics.

Politics and Evolutionary Politics

Even before Darwin published the theory of natural selection, the notion of biological evolution was being used to construct political theory. In 1851, Herbert Spencer published his first book, Social Statics, which proposed a libertarian political ethic based upon Lamarckian evolution and biological progressionism. Eight years later, Darwin’s Origin of Species set forth a new theory of evolution, that of natural selection. While accepting it as a partial explanation for biological change, Spencer believed it to be insufficient, and continued to cling to the older Lamarckian idea of organisms modifying themselves and then passing those modifications on to their offspring. Between the two theories of evolution, Darwin’s, of course, gained prominence, and the political theory that Spencer put forth came to be known as ‘social darwinism.’

Throughout the latter half of the 19^th century, Spencer’s popularity soared, and to many, he was seen as a ‘Second Newton.’ “Survival of the fittest,” became the rallying cry of those who presumed themselves to be the ‘fittest,’ such as Andrew Carnegie and John D. Rockefeller as they crushed competing businesses and exploited their employees. ‘Natural’ progress, along with Spencer’s laissez-faire ideas, were used to condone poverty and starvation as necessary evils on the path to societal perfection (Young, 1987). Whereas Lamarckian evolution claimed that the weak will adapt, Darwinian evolution dictates that the weak must die.

To no one’s surprise today, Spencer’s popularity diminished as quickly as it arose. If the unfounded scientific claims that Spencer employed were insufficient to cause a person to reject his theory, then the political and moral consequences of social darwinism certainly were. Spencer’s most outspoken critic, T. H. Huxley, echoed this sentiment when he said, “let us understand, once for all, that the ethical progress of society depends, not on imitating the cosmic process, still less running away from it, but in combating it” (in Ruse, 1998, p.83). The focus, for Huxley, was on the competitive nature of Darwinian evolution. However, sometimes the best way to compete, is to cooperate. In his The Descent of Man, Darwin acknowledges the role cooperation plays in natural selection.

Darwin states:

There can be no doubt that a tribe including many members who, from processing in a high degree the spirit of patriotism, fidelity, obedience, courage, and sympathy, were always ready to give aid to each other and to sacrifice themselves for the common good, would be victorious over most other tribes, and this would be natural selection (p.30).

Believing that cooperation plays a large role in natural selection, Petr Kropotkin, in 1902, laid out his political philosophy of Anarchistic Communism in his book entitled Mutual Aid. “The ants and termites have renounced the ‘Hobbesian War,’ and they are the better for it,” writes Kropotkin (p. 14). Using examples from nature, he argued that while there is a struggle for existence within a species, there is another struggle taking place between different species, and rival groups of the same species. It is at the second level we find fitness through cooperation. Kropotkin believed that a state of Anarchistic Communism, without central authority, was a more ‘natural,’ more ‘virtuous,’ state of affairs. Kropotkin’s emphasis on cooperation anticipated the study of evolutionary psychology popular today. However, missing from this analysis was the notion of selfishness, which is a crucial explanation on why cooperation occurs. Instead, Kropotkin thought cooperation was the result of selfless behavior on the part of individuals – more bad science. Today, biologists understand that selection occurs at the level of the individual, not the group.

The practice of inferring ethical and political theories from biological evolution was seemingly dealt a deathblow in 1903 with the publication of G. E. Moore’s Principia Ethica. It is always flawed reasoning, he believed, to derive an ‘ought’ from an ‘is.’ Moore labeled this mistake, first pointed out by Hume, the ‘naturalistic’ fallacy. Clearly, this philosophical misstep was committed by Spencer, Kropotkin, and even Huxley (for you cannot draw out an ‘ought not’ from an ‘is,’ either).

Explains Moore:

The survival of the fittest does not mean, as one might suppose, the survival of what is fittest to fulfill a good purpose–best adapted to a good end: at the last, it means merely the survival of the fittest to survive; and the value of the scientific theory, and it is a theory of great value, just consists in shewing what are the cases which produce certain biological effects. Whether these effects are good or bad, it cannot pretend to judge. (P. 48).

The divorce of the political from the biological lasted for a little over 70 years. Then, in 1975 E. O. Wilson published Sociobiology: The New Synthesis. Sociobiology is the study of social behavior as a product of natural selection. While Wilson initially formed his ideas by studying ants, he believed his conclusions to be relevant to all social organisms, including humans.

The argument he puts forth is in four basic parts. Each part best thought of as a rung on a ladder. First, we must understand that some behaviors confer greater fitness for those who employ them over those who do not. Second, if we witness all the members of a population engaging in a certain behavior, we can conclude that its universality grew out of natural selection. Third, since natural selection only occurs when there are genetic differences, we can reasonably assume that those individuals who engage in a fitness maximizing behavior are different from their ancestors who did not engage in said behavior. Fourth, any attempted modifications of that adaptive behavior will be difficult because it will be resisted by a population which is dominated by those individuals engaging in that behavior (Casti, 1989). There are numerous criticisms of Wilson’s project – too numerous to go into at length here. For the purpose of this paper, our attention will be focused on the fourth rung of Wilson’s ladder.

By mentioning the inherent difficulty in modifying or altering human behavior, Wilson inserted himself in the always controversial, hotly contested, nature/nurture debate. This debate has great significance for political and social theorists. If human nature is primarily inborn, then there exist serious limitations on what a government can successfully accomplish. On the other hand, if an individual’s personality is shaped by his or her environment, then, by tweaking that environment, the scope of what a government can successfully accomplish is substantially increased. The utopian socialists generally take for granted the idea that human nature is simply a product of one’s social environment. Robert Owen is a good example that comes to mind. Many thinkers with socialist leanings find comfort in this idea, especially after witnessing the harsh reality of a world lacking in socialist ‘virtues.’ Wilson’s Sociobiology challenged this assumption, and opened up a political can of worms.

The political can of worms referred to here is better known as The Science for the People Sociobiology Study Group. The group was a scientific think-tank made up of notable left-wing biological scientists such as Stephen Jay Gould, Richard Levins, Richard Lewontin, and Steven Rose. While some of the criticisms hurled at Wilson by the group were of a purely scientific, and constructive nature, others were personal, for example, linking him to the Nazis (Casti, 1989). While one might expect a concerted effort on the part of scientists to separate their political opinions from their scientific work, this certainly isn’t the case for population geneticist Richard Lewontin.

Lewontin writes:

Any investigation into the genetic control of human behaviors is bound to produce a pseudoscience that will inevitably be misused. Nothing we can know about the genetics of human behavior can have any implications for human society. But the process has social impact because the announcement that research is being done is a political act ... I treat my job as a political activity (in Casti, 1989, p. 190).

Setting aside the politically motivated attacks for a moment, it is important that we recognize and address the reasonable, more legitimate, gripes against sociobiology.

Of the myriad of criticisms levied against sociobiology, I want to focus on the two most important to the project at hand. The first deals with the attempt to divine ethical truths from evolution. No naturalistic fallacy here. Instead, Wilson, in collaboration with zoologist Michael Ruse, advanced the idea that morality is an illusion fabricated by our genes that facilitates social behavior (thus ensuring the gene’s continued existence). Philosopher Daniel Dennet took this notion to task by reminding us of the ‘genetic fallacy.’ It is incorrect to equate something with that from which it came. Or as philosopher Mary Midgley put it, “It is always a fallacy ... to say ‘that flower is really only organized dirt’” (1991, p.12). Morality may have grown out of evolution and social living, but that does not mean that is all that it is.

The second criticism, not entirely unrelated to the first, concerns the role memes play in perpetuating advantageous behavior. The term ‘meme’ was introduced by Richard Dawkins in 1976 in his now-famous The Selfish Gene. Whereas genes transmit biological information, memes are the units of cultural information. For an example of a meme, Dawkins uses the idea of God. It grows from the ‘meme pool,’ replicates via interpersonal communications, and survives and endures because of its value in the cultural environment. The recognition of the cultural environment is where Dawkins departs from Wilson. Wilson’s claim that socially adaptive behavior arises chiefly from genetics overlooks culture and the relatively large brains we all possess. This is perhaps the most compelling argument against sociobiology that arose from The Sociobiology Study Group, advanced primarily by Stephen Jay Gould. To think of human behavior solely as a product of natural selection assumes too much. Some behaviors are likely the result of non-adaptive changes in the human brain (or ‘spandrels,’ as Gould calls them). Still others are likely the result of the social environment. Gould has a point when he asks, “Why should such a complex and various world yield to one narrowly construed cause?” (Gould, 2000, p.125).

As powerful as these arguments against Wilson’s Sociobiology are, it was most likely the perceived political incorrectness of his project that gave it a black-eye. In 1970s academia, the prevailing belief was scientific research should be steered by political philosophy, or more specifically, Marxism. Wilson’s project deviated from that course, and was criticized for doing so. Wilson (correctly) accused such criticisms as committing what he called the ‘Fallacy of the Political Consequent.’ Nevertheless, the damage was done. Sociobiology was, in the academic environment, selected against.

However, the explanatory power of Darwinian evolution proved too useful a tool to be thrown away with sociobiology. Within the last 10 years or so, Darwinian explanations for human behavior have once again come to the forefront. The new science is called evolutionary psychology, and if you visit your local library or bookstore, you will find numerous books dealing specifically with it. Among those, you may even find a few that mention politics, but very few. Most often they will only be political afterthoughts that are sketchy and best. The reasons for this should be obvious by now. Robert Wright, author of The Moral Animal (arguably the manual on popular evolutionary psychology), writes, “To the extent that the new Darwinian paradigm has reasonably distinct political implications – and as a general rule it just doesn’t – they are about as often to the left as to the right” (1994, p.13). It is generally understood that constructing a political theory out of evolution is a fool’s errand. You just can’t get there from here.

With this in mind, let’s review the pitfalls that must be avoided in bringing together political philosophy and evolutionary theory. First, we must remember not to confuse biological change, with change that is for the better. Second, we must not commit the ‘genetic’ fallacy, or try to equate the thing from which it came. Third, try to remember we have large brains, some of our behaviors might be learned. Fourth, avoid coming across as cold or callus to the weak, poor, or otherwise oppressed, or else the political left will eat us for breakfast. And finally, fifth, remember that going directly from evolutionary theory to political philosophy is a path that should probably be avoided. Chances are, if you try it, you will likely fall into one of the pitfalls mentioned here, or stumble into a new one.

With the history lesson out of our way, and our eyes open to the problems that must be avoided, its time to shift gears. In the next section will look at Randy Barnett’s The Structure of Liberty: Justice and the Rule of Law. It is a relatively recent work of libertarian political philosophy that presents a powerful case for natural rights and private justice.

Libertarianism and the Natural Law Method

It is easy to tell that Randy Barnett’s The Structure of Liberty was written by a lawyer. But for the patient reader the reward is a brilliantly argued, logically sound, political theory in favor of limited government respecting individual liberty. In a Machiavellian mode, Barnett separates ethics from politics, and promotes his ‘blueprint’ for an orderly society that is value-neutral. However, whereas The Prince was concerned with acquiring and keeping political power, The Structure of Liberty is about combating certain difficulties that all societies face. These obstacles, as Barnett sees them, are the problems of knowledge, interest, and power.

It is Barnett’s Natural Law method of analysis that is an interesting departure from other liberal political philosophies. He explains the Natural Law method as one that conforms to the following pattern: “Given that the nature of human beings and the world in which they live is X, if we want to achieve Y, then we ought to do Z” (p.12). The ‘Y’ variable in the above equation for Barnett is “happiness, peace, and prosperity” (p.16). No serious detractor would take issue with this. Therefore, any criticism must challenge the other two variables. Let us now turn our attention to the ‘X’ variable – the nature of human beings and the world in which they live.

What does Barnett understand to be the nature of human beings? Well, he agrees that human ‘instincts’ may limit what government can successfully accomplish. However, Barnett’s argument encompasses much more than mere evolutionary psychology. In his natural law reasoning, “natural tendencies play a very small role”(p. 9). Human behavior is not his primary focus. Instead, he is concerned with human needs and limited human abilities. Barnett enumerates these limited abilities in his discussion on the problems of knowledge, interest, and power.

Barnett breaks down the problem of knowledge into three parts. All three contain crucial aspects that support his theory of justice. However, for the purpose of expediency, I will only examine the first part here: the problem of knowledge as it relates to the use of resources in society. Basically, the point he makes here is that there are many different ways that valuable resources may be used in a society. The problem is knowing which is the best way to use them. Friedrich Hayek placed great emphasis on this problem which Barnett borrows and expounds upon. Roughly stated, we each know many things to be true, and all these ‘individual truths’ are, for the most part, inaccessible by others. Now, it is important to note that all these ‘truths’ are not necessarily true. My ‘truths’ may differ from your ‘truths.’ So, the situation present in any society, is one with a multitude of different ‘truths.’ The problem, as Barnett sees it, is when your knowledge about how resources should be used conflicts with my knowledge. How can we possibly take this conflict into account when making our decisions, if we are unable to access each other’s thinking? The answer is, we cannot. Barnett’s solution is to provide us both with discretionary control over our own resources. Centralized decision-making about resource use is doomed to fail because it is impossible for one person, or a few people, to have access to the relevant knowledge necessary to put resources to their optimal use. From our limited ability to access the ‘truths’ of others, Barnett derives the right of several property, which he defines as, “the right to acquire, possess, use, and dispose of scarce resources” (p.83). This right delegates the use of resources to many and (partially) solves the problem of knowledge.

Building upon the problem of knowledge, Barnett delves into his second problem, the problem of interest. Again, we find he has broken down this problem into three components. They are the problems of partiality, compliance, and incentive. At the risk of doing Barnett great disservice, I will only look at the problem of partiality here.

“People tend to make judgments,” declares Barnett, “that are partial to their own interests or the interests of those who are close to them at the expense of others” (p.136). This is hardly an earthshattering insight. But why is this the case? One explanation which Barnett offers relates back to the problem of knowledge. We act in a partial manner partly because we are more aware of our own interests than the interests of others. Our inability to know the interests of others is again to blame. Also, you will remember that Barnett’s goal is ‘happiness, peace, and prosperity.’ Happiness is an individual’s responsibility to oneself which requires people to act in a manner that is partial to their own interests. So, Barnett’s partiality problem is twofold: (1) we are unable to know all the interests of others, and (2) our happiness requires us to be partial.

The solution to the partiality problem lies, again, in the right of several property. By granting all people jurisdiction over their own resources, partiality is diffused, preventing the self-interested decisions of just the few. The partiality problem is also combated by another right, the right of freedom of contract. This right holds that, “persons may consent to legally enforceable transfers of their property rights,” and, Barnett adds, “transfer of property rights should not be imposed upon them with out their consent” (p.65). This freedom to contract and freedom from contract requires that the partial interests of other people are a part of the decision-making processes when property transfers take place. While we are limited in our ability to know the interests of others, the right of freedom of contract demands that we acknowledge that others have legitimate interests, and deal with them accordingly.

The third problem that all societies face is the problem of power. The problem of power is broken down into two components by Barnett. They are the problem of enforcement abuse and enforcement error. Barnett’s theory of justice is composed of five basic rights. Whenever rights are asserted, there is a tacit understanding that these rights must be upheld and protected by force if necessary. Combined with the problem of partiality, this necessity of force may, and often does, lead to enforcement abuse. This is a very straightforward problem for society. Barnett addresses this problem, along with a problem of enforcement error (mistakes made in justice compliance), by pointing out two more rights. They are the right of self-defense, and the right of restitution. A good way to think of these two rights is as a check against the misuse of power in society.

Each of the three problems discussed in The Structure of Liberty overlap with each other, but are at the same time separate problems in their own right. There are some aspects of the knowledge problem in Barnett’s discussion on the problem of interest. Also, when he talks about the problem of power, interest problems are mentioned. However, if it were possible to solve any one of the problems in a way that was different from Barnett’s, the other two would still remain. Any serious political theory must address all three, and accept the inescapable nature of the reality from which they arise. The problems Barnett identifies accurately fill in the ‘X’ variable in the Natural Law method of analysis – the nature of human beings and the world in which we live. They exist, and because they exist there are serious limitations on what a government can successfully accomplish.

Lest you doubt the serious nature of these problems, Barnett asks us to try and imagine a race of people and a world in which they did not arise.

Barnett states:

These beings would have complete knowledge of everyone’s particular circumstances, including each person’s subjective needs, aspirations, and opportunities; and they would act completely impartially, neither favoring their own interests, nor the interests of those they care for. ... We are not and can never be like them. We live in a world of radically dispersed knowledge and partiality of interests and the liberal conception of justice and the rule of law help us cope with these features of this world (p. 137).

Barnett begins his book by comparing society to a building, and his theory of justice to architectural blueprints. His point is, just like an architect is bound by the laws of physics, a social or political theorist is bound by the social realities of the world in which he or she lives. Just as gravity is real, so too are the problems of knowledge, interest, and power. Barnett’s ‘blueprint’ is his theory of justice which includes five rights:

1) the right of several property

2) the right of first possession

3) the right of freedom of contract

4) the right of restitution

5) the right of self-defense

Each of these rights is necessary to combat the problems Barnett mentions.

By now, you are no doubt asking yourself what all this has to do with evolution. The answer is, absolutely nothing! Barnett’s Structure of Liberty offers up a model for an orderly society largely independent of both moral philosophy, and human ‘instincts.’¹ Its arguments are compelling enough without an appeal to evolutionary psychology. However, when we examine the facts of our evolutionary past, the problems Barnett reveals become more troublesome, and the solutions more vital.

Evolution, Selfishness, and the Problem of Partiality

Of the different problems Barnett describes, the problem of partiality is most apt to get the heads of evolutionists nodding in agreement. In nature, acting out of one’s own self-interest is the rule rather than the exception. George Williams, a giant in the field of evolutionary biology, writes, “As a general rule today a biologist seeing one animal doing something to benefit another assumes either that it is manipulated by the other individual or that it is being subtly selfish” (1988, p.391). From where could such a cynical attitude come?

Let us assume for a moment that apparent acts of altruism were not motivated by selfishness, but by selflessness. Imagine a species of organisms where each individual behaved in a manner that was impartial to the interest of itself and others. At first glance, this does not seem so far-fetched. In fact, some might be tempted to point to a beehive or an ant colony as an example of selfless social behavior. However, social insects such as these are a special case. Each bee in a hive is closely related to the other members of the hive. So, in terms of genetics, the impartiality of the hive is partial to the shared genetic code of that hive. Social organisms, which are not all brothers and sisters, possess a wider range of different genes. Again, this may not seem like a problem. If everybody helps everybody else equally, each organism’s genes have an equal chance of being passed on to future generations. This is all well and good, but such a state of affairs is easily disrupted. Were we to introduce a selfish organism into the population, then that organism would reap the benefits of its partiality, and the impartiality of the others. That organism would thrive in such an environment passing on its genes to its offspring, introducing even more selfish individuals into the population. It would not take long (in evolutionary terms) for the entire species to be overrun with selfish members. So, it appears Williams is correct, the assumption has to be, if witnessing what looks like altruistic behavior, either manipulation, or subtle selfishness is occurring.

Lately, there has been a lot of criticism of the work being done in evolutionary psychology. Some of these complaints are not without their merit. One such critic, Hilary Rose, points out that through adaptionist reasoning, evolutionary psychologists claim to be able to explain both parental protection and infanticide. “Used the like this,” she writes, “selection explains everything and therefore nothing” (p.147). I agree that, in some respects, evolutionary psychology is trying to do too much. This is a mistake I want to be careful not to make here (try to remember, we have large brains). But I do believe that selfishness is an inherent human trait. That is all I am trying to assert here, and I believe even the most entrenched critic of evolutionary psychology will at least grant me this.

Those who argue that culture influences human behavior have a large hurdle to jump if they wish to suggest selfishness is not an inborn trait. We find it throughout the animal kingdom, and witness it in humans across cultures and throughout time. Barnett admits that the natural law reasoning he employs is open to criticism for what he takes to be the nature of humans and the world in which we live. Yet, he avoids the method of discovery used in this paper to discern the reality of human nature. I suspect he does so in an attempt to avoid the types of criticisms and controversies discussed in the first section of this paper. Barnett goes to the extent of aligning himself with John Locke who denied the existence of inborn human ‘instincts,’ and rejected the practice of building moral principles out of natural inclinations. However, the problem of partiality is only solidified when we view it through the lens of evolution. This does not mean his theory needs an evolutionary account of human selfishness. It is only collaborating evidence in support of the problem, strengthening the need for the solutions he provides. Even if the reasoning offered here in support of inherent human selfishness were found to be mistaken, Barnett’s theory still would remain intact.

A Darwinian Left?

Sociologist Hilary Rose’s contempt for evolutionary psychology is apparent in her article “Colonizing the Social Sciences?” Specifically, she believes that evolutionary explanations for human behavior are encroaching upon the independence of the social sciences with defective reasoning, grandiose claims, and misguided cultural agendas. Rose makes some valid points against some recent attempts at explaining behavior through evolution. However, I do not believe she makes the case for shutting this particular avenue of inquiry down completely. Sociology is, after all, an entire science based on the notion of nurture over nature, so her disdain comes as no surprise. What is interesting is that she echoes the sentiment made by Wright who claimed that the political implications of Darwinism are about as often to the left as to the right. She breaths “and almost audible sigh of relief” at this notion, and after noticing Peter Singer in favor of a Darwinian political left, declares evolutionary psychology as a science where you can “pick-your-own politics” (p.150).

It should be clear by now that I, for one, have ‘picked’ my own political theory informed by evolutionary psychology. But is evolutionary theory really so elastic?

If you were going to respond to that question after reading Peter Singer’s A Darwinian Left: Politics, Evolution, and Cooperation, you would almost have to answer ‘no’. Singer spends a good portion of the book contrasting the ‘traditional’ left with his newly proposed Darwinian left. When he is finished, what remains is a political point of view that hardly resembles anything that one would classify as ‘left.’ Even the most staunch libertarian would find very little to disagree with after reading it. Even Singer admits that his Darwinian view “is a sharply deflated vision of the left” (p. 62). In the summary of his book, he outlines several things that the Darwinian leftist must and must not do. See if you agree with how I’ve characterized his thoughts.

Here’s what he states a Darwinian leftist cannot do:

1) “Deny the existence of human nature ...”

2) “Expect to end all conflict and strife between human beings ...”

3) “Assume all inequalities are due to discrimination ...”

And, what a Darwinian leftist must do:

4) “Accept that there is such a thing as human nature ...”

5) “Reject any inference from what is ‘natural’ to what is ‘right;”

6) “Expect that, under different social and economic systems, many people will act competitively ...”

7) “Expect that, regardless of the social and economic system in which they live,

most people will respond positively to genuine opportunities to enter into mutually beneficial forms of cooperation;”

8) “Promote structures that foster cooperation rather than competition, and attempt to channel competition into socially desirable ends;”

9) “Recognize that the way in which we exploit nonhuman animals is a legacy of a pre-Darwinian past ...”

10) “Stand by the traditional values of the left by being on the side of the weak, poor and oppressed, but think very carefully about what social and economic changes will really work to benefit them” (p.60-62).

I can imagine such a political vision being more offensive to the traditional left, than to more conservative political theorists. I wholeheartedly agree with the last point (avoid coming across as cold or callous to the weak, poor, or otherwise oppressed). The bit about exploiting nonhuman animals, is interesting. I am neither offended by it, nor particularly moved to agree. The only point that causes me to raise an eyebrow is number eight, “Promote structures that foster cooperation rather than competition ...” Such a notion is not offensive in and of itself. My only question is ‘how,’ and what does he mean by ‘socially desirable ends?’

The ‘how,’ I fear, in Singer’s mind, is through public policy. Barnett’s political theory fosters cooperation by diffusing partiality and allowing individuals free rein to cooperate, if they so choose. Singer seems to want the government to do more than Barnett would allow. Whereas Barnett’s theory is neutral as to the choices that members in society make, Singer seems to want to guide people’s choices away from the acquisition of wealth, and into other avenues that will make people ‘truly’ happy, like being an active part of a community.

Singer sees government as a tool to guide the quest for status that humans tend to engage in. One suggestion put forth in his book is to place a tax on spending so as to end conspicuous consumption, which he sees as a show of status that places people on a wealth hierarchy. However, the problem of partiality mentioned by Barnett, and supported by evolutionary theory, may make the implementation of such a policy, or policies, difficult. Furthermore, the problems of enforcement error and enforcement abuse may make it downright dangerous.

Barnett distinguishes between two distinct types of morality. Singer’s tax on spending proposal is what Barnett would refer to as a morality of aspiration. Barnett’s theory of justice concerns solely what he calls the morality of duty. Barnett borrows this notion of separate moralities from liberal political theorist Lon Fuller.

Fuller explains:

Where the morality of aspiration starts at the top of human achievement, the morality of duty starts at the bottom. It lays down the basic rules without which an ordered society is impossible, or without which an ordered society directed toward certain specific goals must fail of its mark . . . It does not condemn men for failing to embrace opportunities for the fullest realization of their powers. Instead, it condemns them for failing to respect the basic requirements of social living (p.5-6).

Both sets of morality are important, but the morality of duty is necessary for happiness, peace, and prosperity. When a government pursues a morality of aspiration, often it does so at the risk of the morality of duty. The pursuit of the morality of aspiration, according to Barnett, must not be pursued publicly, but by private individuals and institutions.

But the bigger problem with fostering cooperation toward ‘socially desirable ends’ is knowing and agreeing on what these ends are. Is Singer’s notion of what is socially desirable really so desirable? I’ll just stick with happiness, peace, and prosperity, thank you very much.

Furthermore, Singer, much like Kropotkin before him, is highly enamored with the cooperative aspect of human nature. It is in our nature to cooperate, and he believes, we should look toward game theory as a model on how to build a more cooperative society. Most students of evolution are familiar with game theory. It involves the prisoner’s dilemma. In the game, we are asked to imagine two prisoners that must make a choice; either give evidence against the other and receive a shorter sentence, or stay silent and hope the other stays silent and both face a lesser charge. However, if each gives evidence (defects) against the other, both suffer the most severe penalty. In 1979, Robert Axelrod, a political scientist, set up computer tournaments to find out which strategy for the game performed the best in repeated head to head clashes. Of the different strategies, the one that tended to win out was known as Tit-for-tat. When Tit-for-tat faced defectors, it defected. When it faced cooperators, it cooperated. In a population of Tit-for-taters, cooperators prosper while defectors suffer. Axelrod’s work in game theory seems to offer us insight into how cooperation may have evolved in nature. Singer’s method of constructing a Darwinian left takes Tit-for-tat as a model on how we might be able to construct a society that fosters greater cooperation.²

From this, Singer suggests that, as a society, we should deal with the problem of scale. What he means by this is that the prisoner’s dilemma that leads to cooperation only works when the game is played more than once. In big cities, where most people are anonymous to everyone else, Tit-for-tat, as a strategy, just does not work. It is too easy to cheat (defect) and get away with it. Another suggestion Singer makes, in order to properly take advantage of Tit-for-tat cooperation, is to level out the disparity in power and wealth. If I have no leverage to punish you with when you defect, you have little reason not to.

There appears to be another similarity between Kropotkin and Singer. Despite his protests to the contrary, this line of reasoning appears to be dangerously close to committing the ‘naturalistic’ fallacy. Cooperation is a fact of nature. It may even be a fact most people are happy with. However, the moment Singer argues in favor of supporting the cooperation that occurs naturally, and adjusting society so the ‘game’ can be played like it was ‘meant’ to be played, the fact-value gap is traversed. Or, as Huxley would have put it, ‘the cosmic process is being imitated.’

All of this may be a little unfair to Singer. The simple point I am trying to make here is that evolutionary theory is not so flexible as to support just any political theory. It does have some distinct political ramifications. When it informs a libertarian political philosophy, it successfully supports the claims being made. When it informs a more leftist vision, its pretty much libertarian as well.

Conclusion

The word ‘inform’ has been used several times throughout this paper. This is because I believe ‘to inform’ is all that evolutionary psychology can do in relation to politics. Going directly from evolutionary truths to political theory, while tempting, is woefully misguided. There simply isn’t enough to go on. Past attempts to do so have failed miserably. However, evolutionary psychology grants us insights into what it is to be human. It tells us that there is such a thing as human nature. This knowledge is very valuable in the natural law method of analysis that Barnett employs. Given that human nature tends to be selfish, if we want to achieve happiness, peace, and prosperity, than we ought to adopt Barnett’s theory of justice. This method of analysis is value neutral. It does not pretend to judge whether human nature is ‘good’ or ‘bad.’ Rather, Barnett simply accepts it as it is; simple reality that must be dealt with. This is the strength of Barnett’s The Structure of Liberty. It does not need to be ‘informed’ by evolutionary psychology, but when it is, its conclusions are further confirmed. In such an approach, the ‘naturalistic’ fallacy does not rear its ugly head.

Still, some may argue that holding human selfishness as a constant in the natural law equation is a mistake. Some may suggest human selfishness should be conquered, instead of accepted. In doing so, they may appeal to the fact that human beings have large brains, capable of rejecting those selfish tendencies. Yes, this may be possible. In order to do so, a government or society would have to be structured in a way that ran counter to the natural inclinations of people. This would be a monumental task, to say the least. I would stop just short of saying it was impossible. Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World puts forth and interesting hypothesis as to how this may be done. But, a society that was able to curb human being’s natural inclinations, whether it is through drugs or government intervention, leaves a lot to be desired.

Also discussed in this paper was the belief that evolution was flexible in the types of political theories it could inform. Peter Singer’s recent work in leftist Darwinian politics was examined as an example of this alleged elasticity. However, the view Singer offered was more against the traditional left than it was for it.

Clearly, we have not yet heard the last on the matter. As our understanding of evolutionary psychology continues to unfold, further questions concerning the structure of society will be answered. And, I think it is fair to say, many more questions will be asked. The challenge for philosophers and political scientists is to become objective in their analysis. The facts of evolution, as hard as they may be to uncover, are not flexible. The moment we disregard the truths about human nature we find politically unpalatable, or blindly accept those which we want to be true, our descent into mere sophistry will have begun.

Endnotes

1.Use of the word ‘instinct,’ when referring to humans, means something entirely different from

animal instincts. Generally, we think of animals as ‘slaves’ to their instincts. Animal behavior is little more than genetic programming. Humans are distinct in that we have emotions. Evolutionary psychology goes a long way in explaining why we feel the way we do, and how those feelings may have developed. Emotions tend to influence of decision-making. However, we are not ‘bound’ by our emotions like a dog is bound to obey its instincts.

2. Singer writes that Axelrod’s model has “generally been supported by subsequent work in the

field”(p.51). This is not entirely true. Shortly after Axelrod published his The Evolution of Cooperation, biologists and zoologists realized that there were too few examples of Tit-for-tat strategies at work in nature. A truly stable community is made up of programs engaging in the ‘Pavlov’ strategy. Game theorist Martin Nowak introduced ‘Pavlov’ in 1992. For a fascinating history lesson in game theory, I recommend Matt Ridley’s The Origins of Virtue (1996).

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