Dorcas Chung

The purpose of my paper is to explore how we come to predict and explain the actions or

behaviors of other people, and further to examine how this prediction and explanation

enables us to socially interact and communicate with one another. I specifically want to

explicate the theory developed by Simon Baron-Cohen known as mindreading, and examine

how this theory applies to people with autism. He uses his model of autism to argue that

people with autism are deficient in their development of a theory of other minds. However,

I will argue that his position on autism does not take into account the difference between

the way one interprets an autistic subject's actions, and the way that that autistic

subject interprets her own actions.

Evolutionary Advantages of Behavior Prediction:

Before I begin, I would first like to mention that the prediction of actions and the

communication amongst members inside and outside of one's own species is so important

because it is said to enhance survival and reproduction. Simon Baron-Cohen compares this

ability to the game of chess. First, each individual member (chess piece) needs to be

aware of each of its own members, know how to interact with one another, and strategize

in order to survive and progress . An example of this can be seen in apes, who like humans

have a social hierarchy that enables them to live harmoniously with one another, thus

ensuring better results in gathering food, raising young, protecting from predators, and

navigating through various territories. Second, each player needs to be aware of the

position of its individual members in relation to her opponent's positions. Deception, for

instance, has been shown to be beneficial for survival purposes. When a bird sees a

predator approaching its nest, it will act as if it is injured so as to divert attention from

the nest to the bird itself. By deceiving the predator into thinking that the bird is an easy

kill, the bird can better ensure the survival of its young .

Humans, however, seem to have this ability of predicting behavior and of communicating

to a greater extent. We are able to know more than that we have such an ability, or that

we are able to survive by predicting and communicating in this manner or that manner. We

possess the complex language system of speech, and a capacity to introspect that allows

us to further explore specifically why and how this ability comes about. Because of that,

we are not only able to survive; we are able to advance in ways unique to humankind:

socially, technologically, artistically, philosophically, and so on. My hope is to utilize this

skill of introspection and language to examine the mechanism behind the ability to predict

behavior and communicate.

Three Theories for Behavior Explanation and Behavior Prediction:

Baron-Cohen describes three theories used to examine how we are able to predict and

explain the actions of another person. I will first present the theories he rejects, and then

try to explicate the theory that he endorses. The first theory is what he calls the Physical

Stance. According to this stance, one attempts to understand human actions in terms of

the functions of its biological and chemical mechanisms. For example, we can say that an

individual observes an action, and then makes logical deductions that six particular brain

states were activated in a particular order, which influenced this person's particular

action. We include in this stance such connectionist models as the Hopfield Net, which is

a model that describes what is going on inside the brain by way of connecting nodes

which yield either positive activities - the recognition of particular traits or concepts - or

negative activities - the absence of recognition of particular traits or concepts. This in

turn allows an individual to act according to whatever part of the memory is stimulated or

unstimulated.

Baron-Cohen argues that the Physical Stance has an epistemological problem, namely,

that it assumes humans will have the ability and the knowledge to understand those

biological and chemical mechanisms that cause one to act and behave in a particular

manner. While this model may be accurate, it is impossible to understand the functionality

of such non-observable parts of the human system. Baron-Cohen writes that "neither

ordinary folk nor scientists have a 'brainscope' with which to 'see' what brain states are

active in another person at any given time and then to predict that person's next action."

In effect, this model is too complex for most people to recognize or understand.

The second alternative, known as the Design Stance, attempts to provide a simpler model

of behavior and communication by focusing on the functions of a person's observable

parts. Just as the delete key on a computer signifies the erasing of a program or words on

a document, so certain external detectors on a human signify a particular action or

behavior. The behaviorist approach to psychology is a way of understanding via the

Design Stance, whereby communication and behavior are recognized by way of

reinforcement . For example, if you poked my eyes, my body will react in a particular way.

I will immediately move so as to avoid the pain of being poked, and I will blink, all

presumably in order to protect my eyes.

While the Design approach can also be successful in inferring unobservable processes, it is

still lacking. Mechanical devices such as boom boxes, computers, or cameras have clear

observable parts that enable one to more easily understand its functions; however,

humans and other sentient beings do not have such clear observable parts. Our

observable parts are limited to things like reflexes or reinforcement behavior, which under

this stance thus limits from adequately predicting and intuiting those behaviors that

provide no clear indication of a particular action or lack of action. In other words, while

the Design Stance is good at describing or explaining behavior, it is insufficient in

predicting behavior.

The final approach, called the Intentional Stance, is the alternative that states that

humans will naturally attribute purposeful attitudes to other people, and even

anthropomorphize purposeful attitudes to animals or inanimate objects. For example, if you

observe me walk from my bedroom to my computer, you will assume that I have a purpose

in walking to my computer. You may guess that I want to check my email, or I intend to

work on my paper. Also, I will often times open up a Word document and begin typing

when a little paperclip animation appears and says, "You seem to be writing a letter.

Would you like some help?" In this case, I may say that my computer thinks I want to do

something I don't really want to do. I can similarly apply a purposeful state about my

thermostat in saying that it wants to keep my apartment at 70°F during the winter time

and will therefore shut off when it thinks my apartment is getting too hot.

Purposeful action is consistent with the assumption that mental states have what are

called propositional attitudes. These attitudes provide some sort of causal link between a

person's thoughts and a person's words and actions. To explain, let us consider the words

"intend", "desire", "believe", or "fear." We can say that such words signify attitudes that

are directed towards particular propositions. While these kinds of attitudes are considered

internal or inside a person's mind, the propositions they are directed towards are normally

external or outside the person . In other words, something is being said about somebody's

mental state, namely, that he has an attitude directed towards something, and that

something is the proposition. For example, I can say: "Dorcas intends to finish this paper,"

where the word "intend" is the attitude, directed towards the proposition of finishing this

paper. The same goes for "David Baxter desires to speak to me," "Jill Cavanaugh believes

that I'm a dork," and "Samuel Chung fears confrontation."

The notion of propositional attitudes is important because it is believed that an individual

will perform some action such that the action will signify an intent to actualize that which

is related to what that individual has an attitude about. Consider the following example: I

walk to my kitchen counter at 7AM, pour cereal into a bowl, and proceed to open the

refrigerator door to take out a carton labeled "Milk." What these actions signify are the

propositional attitudes I have about certain things, and the intent to bring about

circumstances such that I am able to react accordingly to these attitudes. Hence, I act in

this way because I believe that the carton labeled "Milk" indeed contains milk; I take out

the carton because I desire to pour milk into my bowl of cereal; and I want to do this

because I am hungry, and I believe that this cereal will satisfy my hunger.

The assumption that another person's actions signify such mental states is extended to

other people by way of empathy . By empathy, we mean that an individual has the natural

ability to understand that another person is another person - one with mental states and

propositional attitudes - just like the individual himself. I can make the inference that,

since my actions are causally connected in some way to my propositional attitudes, the

actions of other people will also be causally connected to their propositional attitudes.

When I perceive what is external (a person's actions), I make a prediction about what is

internal (a person's mind) . Hence, if I observed another person pour cereal in a bowl and

proceed to take out a carton labeled "Milk" from the refrigerator, I will likewise presume

that she believes that the carton contains milk, and that the milk will accompany the

cereal that she will eat to satisfy her hunger.

Theory of Mind and Theory of Theory of Mind:

In order to avoid confusion, I should make the note here that I am exploring this issue

from two levels of analysis. I will call the first level theory of mind, and the second level

theory of theory of mind. The first level, also called mindreading by Baron-Cohen and

mentalization by Uta Frith, describes strictly the kinds of mental states an individual

attributes to another person through his observing this other person's actions and

emotions. We may place in this category of theory of mind the notion of folk psychology.

Folk psychology is a basic way of describing the general, everyday commonsensical

understanding that an individual has of other people. There are two main assumptions

underlying folk psychology: First that I have some kind of privileged access to my own

mind; and second, that from such access I am able to infer that the minds of other people

work in the same ways that mine does. If I threw a baseball through a window, and then

see my father running towards me while yelling at the top of his lungs, my folk psychology

would make me suspect that he is angry with me. If a man tells his girlfriend that she has

gained a lot of weight, the girlfriend may form the theory of mind about her boyfriend that

he intends to insult her.

When we consider this kind of theory of mind, we should note that folk psychology

involves cross-cultural similarities in how one reads attitudes (i.e., in understanding that a

particular facial expression represents a particular feeling) . We should also be aware that

there are similarly cross-cultural differences in a person's theory of mind about another

person (i.e., due to how one is raised, or which culture one is born into). Consider the

action of slurping one's soup or burping during dinner. While an Asian may formulate a

theory of mind about the slurper or burper that she is complimenting the chef on his great

cooking, an American may formulate a theory of mind about the same slurper or burper

that she is being rude and inconsiderate to her dinner party.

The second level - theory of theory of mind - tries to understand how an individual comes

to interpret and infer from the actions or observed emotions of another individual that she

possesses that particular propositional attitude. Though we may say generally that every

normal-functioning human being has a folk psychology of somebody else (a theory of

mind), psychologists or philosophers may question the assumption of folk psychology

itself. Is this the best way to understand how we attribute mental states to other people?

In this situation, one may say that while the theory of mind operates under a certain

paradigm, the theory of theory of mind evaluates the paradigm itself, and questions

whether it is the best way to understand how minds work. Thus we can see that my

presenting the Physical Stance, Design Stance, and Intentional Stance above is an

examination of this issue from the level called theory of theory of mind, rather than theory

of mind. I will now continue by further exploring the theory of mind that Baron-Cohen calls

mindreading.

Evidence for the Intentional Stance:

Baron-Cohen claims that we can test mindreading or the Intentional Stance. He begins

with a model that includes four mechanisms for mindreading capabilities . He then presents

studies that test this model by observing the actions and expressions of babies and

toddlers. If humans have a natural ability to mindread, this should be demonstrated in its

most easily observed form. In other words, it should be demonstrated in babies and

toddlers.

Simon Baron-Cohen's Mindreading System

The first mechanism, the Intentionality Detector (ID), utilizes the senses (such as sight

and sound) in order to detect the most basic or primitive forms of goal-directedness, such

as want and desire. One also may say that this primitive goal directedness is a more

primitive form of propositional attitudes. We should note that this is not a trait unique to

human beings. Other mammals, amphibians, insects, and even amoebas, for example, are

goal-directed organisms, because they have been selected for by evolution to seek

pleasure or avoid pain . As a result, we can know to a greater extent that humans have

ID. Studies done on babies have shown this by their sensitivity to the changes in the

behavior that adults have towards them, such as recognizing things like the difference

between giving and teasing.

The second mechanism known as the Eye-Detection Detector (EDD) utilizes the sense of

sight, and signifies the ability of a person to recognize eye contact or eye movement.

Studies find that 2-month old infants have a fascination for the eyes, as if they recognize

that the other person looking at them is another sentient being. Not only do they notice

the eyes more than any other part of the face, they also seem to distinguish between

somebody looking at them and somebody looking elsewhere. There is also a tendency in

six-month old babies to look at somebody longer if that somebody is looking back at them,

and a tendency in three-year-old children to be able to identify whether other faces are

looking at them. The game of peekaboo is a very good confirmation of this, since babies

and children seem to be quite thoroughly stimulated by the sudden visual contact of eyes.

Eye contact is important because it gives cues into a person's mental states. For

example, it is often the case that a parent can tell when a child lies by watching the

movement of his eyes. One can say that EDD provides the means by which a person can

have joint-attentional functions, or the third mechanism, called the Shared-Attention

Mechanism (SAM). Incidentally, while ID and EDD build dyadic representations of

mindreading (a relationship between Agent and Object, or Agent and Self), joint-attention

or SAM builds triadic representations of mindreading (a relationship between Agent, Self,

and Object). Triadic representations require that the Self concur, or at least partially

concur, with the Object that is perceived by the Agent. To better explain this, we can

say that Belia's seeing a woodchuck run into the bushes presents a dyadic representation

- the relationship here is between Belia (the Agent) and the woodchuck (the Object).

However, if we considered a third person named Rep observing what Belia observes, we

can say that Rep provides the triadic representation. Hence, Rep (the Self) is able to

perceive and report on what Belia (the Agent) likewise perceives, namely, the woodchuck

(the Object). Studies on children to show this triadic representation can be understood

similarly in this way: by reporting the perceptions of others and, where applicable,

attributing goal-directed states to them. Through utilizing EDD (i.e., eye-contact),

children are able to sense a goal (ID) in others and report a prediction of what those

other people or animals will do. By way of SAM, 3-4-year-old children have recognized

that, if they perceived a person looking at Candy Bar A rather than Candy Bar B or Candy

Bar C, it is likely that that person wants what she is looking at, that is, Candy Bar A.

The fourth and final mechanism described by Baron-Cohen is called the Theory-of-Mind

Mechanism (ToMM). ToMM synthesizes the representations of the aforementioned

epistemic states with those more complex forms of propositional attitudes, such as

thinking, believing, knowing, and recognizing. The unique aspect of ToMM are M-

Representations, which allow for referential opacity, or the suspension of the truth values

of propositional attitudes. We can say for example, that when Belia saw the woodchuck

run into the bushes, she believed that the animal that ran into the bushes was a

woodchuck, even if the animal was actually a skunk. In this case, it didn't matter whether

the animal that Belia saw was a woodchuck or a skunk; what mattered was that she

believed it was a woodchuck, or that her M-Representation of the animal was a

woodchuck. This is important because it assumes that, though both Rep and Belia

perceived the same object run into the bushes, Rep can predict that Belia's attitude about

that proposition is one way, even if Rep's attitude about that proposition is another way.

In other words, by understanding that Belia can hold false beliefs, Rep is able to

distinguish his own mind from Belia's mind, and thus form an M-Representation of her

mental state. Consequently, he can mindread.

It would therefore not be surprising that one of the most useful studies to test ToMM in

children is to determine whether they are able to understand that other people can have

false beliefs, and whether they are able to deceive . In one such study to test an

understanding of false beliefs, children - I'll singularize and give them the generic name

Child A - are given a tube labeled "Smarties" and asked what is contained inside. Because

this tube is named after the Smarties candy, Child A originally believes (justifiably) that

candy is contained inside the tube. The experimenter then opens the tube and reveals

that there was not candy, but rather pencils inside. Later on, another child - who I will

give the generic name Child B - enters the room. Child B presumably has never been

shown what is inside the tube. To see whether Child A is able to form a theory of mind

about Child B, the experimenter asks Child A what Child B thinks is inside the tube. If Child

A states that Child B thinks there is candy inside the tube, it will show that Child A can

understand that Child B has an M-Representation about the tube that candy is contained

therein. Conversely, if Child A states that Child B thinks there are pencils inside the tube,

it will show that Child A fails to mindread Child B. In this case, Child A would have reported

about reality rather than the belief state of Child B.

Another study testing the ability of children to deceive involves a rabbit puppet and a wolf

puppet playing a game with a child. While the rabbit puppet played the role as friend, the

wolf puppet played the role as foe. The purpose of the game was for the child to allow

the rabbit puppet access to candy inside a box, and prevent the wolf puppet access to

the candy by way of deception. In order to test how the child would respond to either

puppet, there was a padlock to signify that the box could be locked. The box was

purposely unlocked, so that both puppets could open the box and get the candy.

However, the puppets would not approach the box unless the child told them whether the

box was locked or unlocked. If the rabbit puppet inquired about the box, the child was to

give an affirmative response and allow the rabbit access. If the wolf puppet inquired about

the box, the child was to lie and give a negative response, in order to prevent the wolf

from approaching the box and thus opening it. If these children were able to lie and

deceive the wolf puppet, it would be evidence for the child's ability to mindread .

What these studies found is that the ability to ToMM is not innate and was not as clear-

cut as ID, EDD, and SAM seem to be. The Smarties tube test, in particular, found that

children under the age of 3 are generally unable to recognize that others have false

beliefs. Interestingly enough, they are also generally unable to acknowledge that, before

their beliefs were falsified, they themselves had previously thought that candy rather than

pencils were contained inside the tube. On the other hand, those who are older than 3 are

generally able to state that this other person holds a false belief about the box that it

contained candy rather than pencils. The study seems to support a position that most

normal-functioning human beings do gain ToMM naturally; however it is a developmental

process in thinking that does not surface until children are around 4 years of age.

Psychologist Peter Mitchell writes, "Gopnik and Astington concluded that there is a single

cognitive deficit in the young children that explains their poor performance across a

variety of tests of false belief. They asserted that at approximately 4 years of age,

clinically normal children benefit from a radical conceptual shift in their thought that

equips them with a representational theory of mind."

Analysis of Autism:

Autistics present a unique look into the ability (or lack thereof) to mindread. People with

autism suffer from a developmental disorder that affects their social and cognitive

functions, which further prevents them from interacting with others in the way that

normal-functioning human beings would. For the purposes of this paper, I will not delve

too deeply in explicating the details of this disorder. I will, however, note several aspects

of autism that I think are relevant to Baron-Cohen's mindreading project.

Baron-Cohen uses his mindreading model as the paradigm for pinpointing the source of the

autistic disorder. He finds that autistics are indeed capable of ID, citing evidence for their

communicating wants and desires. Kristen Ong, who worked as a behavioral therapist for

two years at the former Verdugo Hills Psychotherapy Center (now called Pacific Child and

Family Associates) in the Southern California area, supports this position by providing the

following example:

I was working with a child (I'll call him Johnny). Johnny loved chips but wouldn't ask for

them. He would put his hand out and whine. I would bring chips to the session and in the

middle while he was working, I would take out a chip and eat one. Of course, he would

put his hand out and as I would ignore him, he would move his hand closer and closer until

it was right next to my mouth.

Though he had trouble communicating his desires through language, Johnny's love for

chips clearly shows that he is able to utilize his senses and act accordingly to achieve

that which his wants are directed towards.

Baron-Cohen finds that autistics can understand and interpret eye direction, and thus are

not deficient in EDD . However, there are some peculiarities in the way they make eye

contact with other people. As we have already seen, eye contact and eye direction is

important because it gives cues into a person's mental states. In her book, Autism:

Explaining the Enigma, Frith mentions that a normal-functioning child tends to

communicate with others by intentional pointing, for the purpose of seeking a mutual

understanding about whatever the child is pointing to. For example, a child may point to

an animal in a zoo and seek his dad's affirmation of its existence. His dad in turn would

probably reply, "Yes, honey, that's a giraffe! Look at the long neck!" When children seek

mutual understanding in this way, they are already assuming that these other people are

other minds. This, however, is not the case with children who have autism. The eye gaze

of autistics is often interpreted as blank, as if any person they are near is an inanimate

object rather than another subject. When autistics utilize their eyes, they do it by way of

instrumental pointing rather than intentional pointing. In other words, they point to

something only if they desire it; they do not point in order to affirm a mutual

understanding of it. This in turn leads to the hypothesis that children with autism initially

cannot make a distinction between their own minds and the mind of another . Using his

model, Baron-Cohen claims that because the level of psychological stimulation through

EDD in autistics is questionable, the joint-attentional functions - SAM - in turn will be

questionable.

The speculation that autistics have a deficiency in comprehending the triadic

representationalism of SAM is verified by several observations. Two such observations

are: an autistic's speech, which tends to be too loud, too soft, or too monotone; and

what Leo Kanner calls an autistic's insistence on sameness, i.e., a resistance to changes

in everyday routines. If their routine is in some way disturbed, it is not unusual for the

autistic to throw a tantrum. These two characteristics are attributed to an oversensitivity

and/or undersensitivity to multiple stimulation of the senses (the oversensitivity and/or

undersensitivity varies from autistic to autistic, and from situation to situation). Temple

Grandin, a woman diagnosed with autism, seems to reiterate this by writing that the

insistence is due to difficulties in synthesizing multiple sensory input, and then choosing

which input needs to be attended to . Baron-Cohen argues that this difficulty in turn

affects the output from SAM to ToMM.

Like SAM, there are also a number of instances where the lack of ToMM is observed in

people with autism. However, I will only describe two. One instance is found in another

characteristic observed by Kanner, that is, autistic aloneness. By this, he does not mean

that autistics are shy and prefer to shrink back from contact with people. Rather, he

means that autistics are unresponsive to people, and likewise do not seem to care about

being in contact with other humans. Mitchell interprets this to mean that autistics appear

to fail in connecting with other minds, preferring instead their own inner world .

A second instance is found in the aforementioned studies involving the reporting of false

beliefs and deception. The Smarties tube study and wolf puppet deception study, for

example, indicate that children over 4 years old with autism have significantly failed to

attribute a false belief to other people. What is intriguing, however, is that blind people -

who obviously would have no ability to EDD - are still able to deceive and formulate

referentially opaque M-Representations about others, whereas autistic people - who do

have sight and are past the mental age of 4 -consistently fail in reporting the false beliefs

of others. These results in turn provide further confirmation of the hypothesis that people

with autism are mindblind in much the same way that colorblind people are colorblind .

Anomaly to the Paradigm:

Having explored the evidence given to support the hypothesis that autistics over the

mental age of 4 initially are deficient in SAM and ToMM, I want to now examine an

anomaly that may be used to refine or refute Baron-Cohen's model. The specific anomaly

that I would like to examine is found in the autobiography of Temple Grandin. Grandin

provides a unique perspective into the mind of an autistic, because she herself was

diagnosed with autism. She has since overcome many of the difficulties faced by people

with autism, and now holds a Ph.D. in animal behavior. My intent here is to see how her

experiences as an autistic child hold up to the Intentional Stance and Baron-Cohen's

mindreading model. I do realize that Grandin is one person who provides a single anomaly

in comparison to the long list of observations done by various researchers that support

the autistics' initial lack of mindreading abilities. However, because she is one of very few

people who are able to provide an inside perspective of the mind of an autistic, I believe

that Grandin's story is worth considering.

In her book, Emergence: Labeled Autistic, Grandin recalls a number of experiences that

appear similar to those who suffer from autism. Like most others, she had a monotone

voice, avoided making eye contact with other people, and participated in obsessive

behavior such as excessive spinning. She also appeared very adverse to physical

affection, such as hugging or hand-shaking. In addition, Grandin writes that she had

greatly preferred the world of her inner mind over those external to her .

Grandin's difficulties in socializing in turn caused a variety of social problems, which made

it easy for others to misconstrue her outward actions. In grade school, she was frequently

disciplined for misconstrued behavior. When a teacher admonished her about her lack of

concern for schoolwork, Grandin writes, "I did care, but my inability to express my feelings

and thoughts rhythmically sabotaged my desires." In another instance, Grandin - then in

third grade - had taken a summer camp trip. Through a variety of situations, children had

introduced Grandin to a new set of vocabulary words, which she found rather fascinating.

She wrote that she enjoyed the way these words rolled on her tongue, and soon found

herself obsessed with saying them, even though she did not know what they meant.

Unfortunately, these words were: "boobs"; seeing a boy's "peter"; and "I'm ripe." Needless

to say, she was misunderstood as "making a pass" at the other boys, and being "sexually

advanced, over-sexed and unnaturally obsessed with sex." Within a week of the camp,

Grandin had found herself in the infirmary with a urinary infection, with the nurse claiming

that the infection was due to her masturbating too much.

Despite these experiences, Grandin does remember instances where her actions and

intentions were dissimilar to those who suffer from autism. She reports that she had the

ability to deceive, and like any other devious child, she did it frequently. She recalls

finding creative ways to trick the "seeker" during games of hide and seek, and also did her

share of damaging property. When she was around 9 or 10 years old, she and her friend

Sue decided to throw whiskey bottles at their teacher's garden. This, of course, caused a

great amount of wreckage. When the teacher lamented about her damaged garden to the

class the next day, Grandin looked her teacher straight in the eye for the first time, and

told her that she did not know who ruined the garden, but saw two other boys near her

house on the same day. When the teacher escorted these boys to the principal's office,

Grandin said she was thoroughly satisfied to see these two boys - who regularly taunted

her - get in trouble. After all, "they might have done it if they'd thought of it." In another

instance, Grandin recalls assisting her cousin Peter in wrecking his neighbor's lawn. When

Peter mentions that they would no doubt be caught, Temple giggled and replied, "Who's to

blame? The dogs did it."

One may say that Grandin's deception examples that are anomalies do not refute the

position that autistics are deficient in SAM and ToMM. Grandin's ability to deceive may

have been because she is a high-functioning autistic, and was able to develop a theory of

mind by the age of 9 or 10. However, Mitchell also offers examples of autistic people who

are able to deceive.

Moreover, it is important to consider Grandin's explanation for her behavior by going back

to her earliest childhood memories . As I had previously mentioned, one of the problems

with autism is the failure to synthesize multiple sensory inputs, which in turn prevents the

individual with autism from interacting with other minds in the "normal" way. This indeed

seems consistent with an autistic's deficiency of SAM. On the other hand, while Grandin's

outward symptoms previously led us to speculate on her deficient theory of mind; the

explanations she gives for those symptoms indicate otherwise. Grandin's account does not

imply that the sensory overload prevented her from making triadic representations; rather,

it implies that the sensory overload prevented her from acting upon the propositional

attitudes that were based on those triadic representations. As a young child, she knew

that her mother was there, and was talking to her. Nevertheless, she found it really hard

to make eye contact at the time because there was too much sensory stimulation for her

brain to handle. She writes, "I ached to be loved - hugged. At the same time I withdrew

from over-touch as from my overweight, overly affectionate, 'marshmallow' aunt," and

further, "It was as if a sliding glass door separated me from the world of love and human

understanding."

In addition, the aforementioned examples regarding her misconstrued behavior do show

that there were instances where she not only had difficulty expressing her propositional

attitudes, but other "normal-functioning" people had difficulty interpreting her actions as

representing a true set of propositional attitudes. This interpretation of her propositional

attitudes were not false in the way of reporting referentially opaque M-Representations.

Instead, those who misinterpreted her behavior had made referentially false reports of

Grandin's M-Representations. Of course, it is not unusual for children to be misunderstood,

just as it is not unusual for an American to form a theory of mind about an Asian who

slurps her soup that she is being rude and inconsiderate. We could say that we recognize

that the American had failed to make a veridical prediction in her mindreading of the Asian

slurper due to various cultural biases. Just as the American had assumed falsely that the

actions of the Asian represent intentions similar to Americans, we can say that these

children and adults had formed a theory of mind about Grandin that her actions signified

particular mental states.

Decoding Difficulties:

What I want to propose is the possibility that a theory of theory of mind, like the one

proposed by Baron-Cohen, may fail to understand an autistic's mind, when theory of

theory of mind theorists do not try to put aside their own beliefs that actions signify a

purposeful state. To explain, Frith considers in the second edition of her book that her

original notion of a triadic representation of mind, namely, the synthesizing of multiple

sensory inputs, is misguided. She writes that while autistics lack a central coherence, or

an ability to understand things in terms of a larger context or ultimate purpose,

mindreading - or mentalizing as Frith calls it - does not require the large amounts of

information integration that central coherence requires. "Many able people with autism

manage to acquire a theory of mind, even without the facilitating effects of a mechanism

that allows intuitive mentalizing." Frith and Baron-Cohen himself hypothesize that people

with autism are much more capable of systematizing information rather than empathizing

with others. By systematizing, he means that autistics have an amazing ability to focus

and even obsess over the intricate details of something, rather than the ability to look at

something in terms of a "bigger picture" or greater purpose. This is likened to the modern-

day geek, who often has a very narrowly-focused interest in a particular field, yet may

have little or no interest in how that narrowly-focused interest connects with other more

practical areas of life, and may have a very poor understanding in social norms or social

interactions.

A good example of this may be seen in the picture inserted above, which is located on the

front cover of Frith's book. Here you see four people playing cards. While the person on

the left is hiding his cards, the two in the middle are looking suspiciously at that player

and suspecting that he is conniving something. The player on the right, however, seems

to be oblivious to what is going on, and seems to be thinking about his next hand .

According to Frith, a normal-functioning human being would interpret this picture in terms

of the kind of intentional states that I have named. We look at this and try to understand

the bigger picture. When Frith showed this picture to a high-functioning autistic named

A.C., she writes:

On the cover of your book there's a picture of some people playing cards. I remember

looking at the picture for something like an hour, figuring out how smooth the pigments of

the paints the artist [used] had to be, and the quality of brushes, and how greatly

developed the sub-economy of artists at that time must have been to demand that

quality of painting and of reproduction of the actual textures of the fabrics in the

characters' clothes, and of course this is the most obvious thing about the painting, the

high realism and the skill of the artist, and then I read inside the book, and I was like,

What the hell? There's this whole "soap opera" that the "normal" person is supposed to

pick on first, and this person cheating, and that person knows, and that other person

doesn't, etc. it's nuts!

The perspective given by both A.C. and Grandin thus lead us to consider whether the

normal-functioning individual falsely assumes that the actions of the autistic individual

represent intentions or a lack of intentions similar to normal-functioning individuals. Any

study offering evidence for a deficiency in SAM or ToMM must be considered in light of the

possibility that the observer misinterpreted the actions of the autistic subjects. In other

words, we should take into account a potential difference between the way the observer

interprets the actions of the autistic, and the way the autistic subject interprets his own

actions.

Conclusion:

In this paper I have offered an explication of a theory into how we are able to explain the

actions of other people and attribute mental states to them. I have provided a model

presented by Simon Baron-Cohen to describe how normal-functioning human beings

mindread. I have also given an account of autism, and attempted to show how there may

be problems in how Baron-Cohen uses his model to explain autistics' deficiencies in

mindreading. While the problems presented do not refute his theory, they do call into

question the evidence he offers for his theory.